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Theory of Mind in Bipolar Disorder, 
with Comparison to the impairments 
Observed in Schizophrenia
Rachel L. C. Mitchell* and Allan H. Young
Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London, London, UK
Our ability to make sense of information on the potential intentions and dispositions of 
others is of paramount importance for understanding their communicative intent, and 
for judging what an appropriate reaction might be. Thus, anything that impinges on this 
ability has the potential to cause significant social impairment, and compromise an indi-
vidual’s level of functioning. Both bipolar disorder and schizophrenia are known to feature 
theory of mind impairment. We conducted a theoretical review to determine the extent 
and types of theory of mind impairment in bipolar disorder, and evaluate their relationship 
to medication and symptoms. We also considered possible mediatory mechanisms, and 
set out to discover what else could be learnt about the impairment in bipolar disorder 
by comparison to the profile of impairment in schizophrenia. The literature established 
that in bipolar disorder (i) some form of theory of mind impairment has been observed 
in all mood states, including euthymia, (ii) the form of theory of mind assessed and task 
used to make the assessment influence the impairment observed, and (iii) there might 
be some relationship to cognitive impairment, although a relationship to standard clinical 
variables was harder to establish. What also became clear in the literature on bipolar 
disorder itself was the possible relationship of theory of mind impairment to history of 
psychotic symptoms. Direct comparative studies, including patients with schizophrenia, 
were thus examined, and provided several important directions for future research on 
the bases of impairment in bipolar disorder. Particularly prominent was the issue of 
whether theory of mind impairment could be considered a candidate endophenotype 
for the psychoses, although current evidence suggests that this may be premature. The 
differences in impairment across schizophrenia and bipolar disorder may, however, have 
genuine differential effects on social functioning and the likely success of remediation.
Keywords: bipolar disorder, psychoses, schizophrenia, social cognition, theory of mind
“Social cognition” describes the mental operations that underlie social interactions, including 
perceiving, interpreting, and generating responses to the intentions, dispositions, and behaviors of 
others (1). “Theory of mind” is a crucial facet of social cognition, and can be defined as the ability 
to infer and predict the intentions, thoughts, desires, intuitions, behavioral reactions, plans, and 
beliefs of other people (1–3), through an awareness that others have a mind with mental states, 
information, and motivations that may differ from one’s own (4, 5). Here, cognitive theory of mind 
refers to the ability to make inferences about other people’s beliefs, whereas affective theory of mind 
refers to the ability to make inferences about other people’s feelings. A prominent feature of bipolar 
disorder is its significant negative impact on work-related, interpersonal, and leisure activities (6). As 
January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 1882
Mitchell and Young Bipolar Disorder – Theory of Mind
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org
theory of mind is so central to human life, any impairment of this 
cognitive capacity can only be detrimental to social functioning 
(7). The initial aim of this review is to further characterize the 
socio-cognitive profiles of patients with bipolar disorder by con-
ducting a critical review of theory of mind in this patient group. 
This aim will be achieved via the presentation and synthesis of 
currently available published evidence. In recent years, a number 
of reviews have either had to present broad overviews of theory of 
mind and other related social skills (8–12), or evaluate evidence 
from a range of related diagnostic groups (13, 14). However, the 
recent surge of publications focused on theory of mind in bipolar 
disorder allows us to now present a more focused synopsis. In 
order to collate this evidence, a systematic search of the literature 
was conducted using the PsychINFO and Medline databases, 
covering the period from 1975 up to September 2015. The search 
terms used in examining these databases were [bipolar AND 
(disorder OR depression)] OR (mania OR manic) OR (euthymia 
OR euthymic) OR [(mood OR affective) AND disorder] AND 
[(“theory of mind”) OR mindedness OR mentalizing OR mental-
izing]. Review articles touching on social cognition in bipolar 
disorder were also examined to check for studies not captured 
by the search above, through backward citation searching. After 
reviewing the literature gathered by these means, the following 
areas of discussion were identified.
In the first part of the paper, we tackle the question of whether 
impaired theory of mind is characteristic across the mood states 
and whether it persists after symptomatic remission. Similarly, 
we ask whether it is present in both bipolar I disorder and bipolar 
II disorder and consider whether it can be detected in related 
“high-risk” or “sub-syndromal” populations. We also examine 
the evidence for such impairments in pediatric samples. We then 
assess methodological factors that may have confounded previous 
research, such as the type of assessment used and demographic 
influences. Here, we also highlight the seemingly varying scale 
of the problem and its breadth across different types of theory 
of mind. In the final section of part one, we seek to establish 
what the antecedents of impaired theory of mind are in bipolar 
disorder and what the symptom correlates of these deficits are. 
Medication effects are also considered. In achieving our initial 
aim, the hope is to generate information for clinicians who work 
with this patient group to help improve clinical outcomes (15).
In the second part of the paper, the aim is to review evidence 
on whether impaired theory of mind can be considered a trait 
marker for psychosis across both affective and non-affective 
psychoses. Specifically, we ask whether patients with bipolar 
disorder and those with schizophrenia present with similar 
impairments. Here, we do not set out to serve as a review of 
schizophrenic theory of mind per  se, nor to make narrative 
comparisons between the separate literatures on theory of mind 
in the two disorders. Rather the purpose of this part of this paper 
is to establish the significance of data studies that have directly 
and quantitatively compared theory of mind abilities in the two 
disorders. Given the poorly understood origin of theory of mind 
deficits in bipolar disorder, we evaluate the possibility that a link 
to psychosis should be an important line of enquiry (13). Looking 
beyond the question of origin, could impaired theory of mind 
serve as a useful endophenotype of proneness to psychosis? We 
first tackle this question by reviewing studies of bipolar disorder, 
which have compared the profile of impairment of theory of mind 
in bipolar patients who do and do not present with psychosis. We 
then move on to assessing studies that have explicitly contrasted 
theory of mind in schizophrenia vs. those in bipolar disorder. It 
is clear that theory of mind impairments in schizophrenia appear 
more severe than those in bipolar disorder. Reasons for the pos-
sible difference in size of impairment is examined, including both 
symptom and neurocognitive mediators. Close examination of 
the similarities and differences in theory of mind is important 
because of the impact of these deficits on social functioning, 
which in turn, might help explain the differences in outcome 
between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (16).
We conclude the review by suggesting implications for clinical 
management and propose next steps for research on theory of 
mind in bipolar disorder and its possible role as a trait marker 
for psychosis.
iMPAiRMeNTS OF THeORY OF MiND iN 
BiPOLAR DiSORDeR
Given that impaired social cognition in patients with serious 
mental illness impacts on increased symptom severity, prolonged 
course of illness, higher rates of relapse, and daily functioning, 
characterization of the extent of these deficits is important (14, 17, 
18). Although bipolar disorder is commoner than schizophrenia, 
theory of mind in this condition has been under-explored relative 
to its study in schizophrenia (7). We summarize current literature 
for the reader in Table 1.
The Clinical Generalizability of 
impairments across Sub-Groups
One issue that has complicated the study of theory of mind in 
bipolar disorder is that this diagnostic label actually comprises 
a group of disorders with heterogeneous clinical presentation, 
course, and outcome (43, 44). Not only does the clinical course 
change as a patient cycles through recurrent depressive, manic, 
and sometimes mixed mood states (45), there are subtypes of 
bipolar disorder based on the severity of mania experienced, 
variable occurrence of psychosis within these subtypes (46), and 
related sub-syndromal bipolar subtypes to contend with (47). 
There has as yet been little systematic comparison of impairments 
in theory of mind across all subtypes, even though the vari-
ability in clinical presentation might seem to necessitate it (35). 
It is likely that inconsistent results in the past may have partly 
reflected the heterogeneous presentation of bipolar disorder (10), 
the mixed nature of samples, and even indiscriminate mixing of 
samples with other affective disorders, such as major depression 
(24, 28). While the socio-cognitive profile of bipolar disorder 
across mood states is somewhat unclear (14), currently available 
evidence suggests that some form of impairment exists whatever 
the symptomatic phase of illness (48).
In one of the first studies to compare the performance of 
patients experiencing a depressed vs. manic mood state, the per-
formance of both groups was impaired relative to healthy controls 
(26). In a first-order “false-belief ” task, the ability to understand 
TABLe 1 | Overview of theory of mind research in studies assessing patients with bipolar disorder without direct comparison to patients with schizophrenia.
Study Samplea Diagnostic 
criteria
Participant 
characteristics
Medication details Taskb Key results
Barrera 
et al. (19)
N = 12 EUTH 
(7 BP1, 5 
BP2); N = 12 
HC
DSM-IV and 
ICD-10; 
outpatients
EUTH: mean age: 
48.2 years; 100% 
M/0% F
Mood stabilizers (10/12), atypical antipsychotics (5/12), 
sedatives (4/12)
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; 
the Faux Pas Recognition Test
Trend toward impaired cognitive ToM, and 
trend toward association with higher number 
depressive episodes
HC: mean age 
46.0 years; 100% 
M/0% F
Affective ToM not impaired. No correlation 
between functionality and ToM
Benito 
et al. (20)
N = 44 BD 
(39 BP1, 6 
BP2); N = 48 
HC
DSM-IV-
TR; stable 
outpatients
BP: mean age 
42.3 years; 36.4% 
M/63.6% F
Not specified The Hinting Task Patients’ verbal ToM impaired relative to 
HC. Performance not correlated with global 
functioning
HC: mean age 
45.7 years; 37.5% 
M/62.5% F
Bora 
et al. (21)
N = 43 EUTH 
(BP1); N = 30 
HC
DSM-IV; in- 
vs. outpatients 
not specified
EUTH: mean age 
38.6 years; 53% 
M/47% F
All patients treated with mood stabilizers. Atypical 
antipsychotic (6/43); antidepressant (2/43); 
mood stabilizer only (28/43); mood stabilizer 
and anticonvulsant (9/43); mood stabilizer and 
antipsychotic (6/43)
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task; 
the Hinting Task
EUTH impaired on both ToM tasks. No effects 
gender or drug treatment, clinical variables, 
nor history psychosis. Some correlations with 
executive functionHC: mean age 
38.9 years; 43% 
M/57% F
Cusi et al. 
(22, 23)
N = 25 BP (17 
BP1, 7 BP2, 
1 BPnos; 10 
EUTH, 12 
DEPsub, 3 
DEPmod); 25 
HC
DSM-IV; 
mixed 
inpatients and 
outpatients
BP: mean age 
45.2 years; 28% 
M/72% F
Mood stabilizer (11/25); anticonvulsant (22/25); 
antidepressants (14/25); typical antipsychotics (3/25); 
atypical antipsychotics (18/25); sedatives (22/25); no 
medication (1/25)
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task BP impaired. Performance associated with 
illness duration. Performance not associated 
with social functioning
HC: mean age 
44.2 years; 28% 
M/72% F
Inoue 
et al. (24)
N = 50 AFF 
euth (34 
MDD; 16 BP); 
N = 50 HC
DSM-IV; in- 
vs. outpatients 
not specified
EUTH: mean age 
44.5 years; 56% 
M/44% F
All patients receiving medication. Antidepressants 
(49/50); typical antipsychotic (6/50); atypical 
antipsychotic (4/50)
Custom-made picture sequencing 
task using caricatures and verbal 
descriptions, followed by first- and 
second-order ToM questions
AFF impaired on second-order ToM only. No 
correlations with IQ
HC: mean age 
38.9 years; 56% 
M/44% F
Ioannidi 
et al. (25)
N = 29 BP1 
(in both a 
symptomatic 
and euthymic 
phase); 
N = 29 HC
DSM-IV-
TR; in- vs. 
outpatients 
not specified
BP1: mean age 
44.2 years; 41.4% 
M/58.6% F
HC: mean age 
44.9 years; 41.4% 
M/58.6% F
All patients receiving mood stabilizers. Majority 
also received antipsychotics, antidepressants or 
benzodiazepines
Two stories examined ability to 
appreciate first-order false beliefs; the 
Hinting Task; the Faux Pas recognition 
task
Significantly lower performance in all ToM 
tests during acute phases vs. HC. Only 
impaired on Faux Pas test in euthymic phase. 
Faux Pas test impairments not significant 
when neuropsychological performance 
accounted for
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(Continued)
Study Samplea Diagnostic 
criteria
Participant 
characteristics
Medication details Taskb Key results
Kerr et al. 
(26)
N = 20 MAN; 
N = 15 DEP; 
N = 13 EUTH; 
N = 15 HC
DSM-IV; 
mixed 
inpatients and 
outpatients
MAN: mean age 
41.3 years; 55% 
M/45% F
Mood stabilizer (47/48-collapsed across groups)
MAN: antipsychotics (20/20); antidepressants (1/20); 
anticonvulsants (5/20)
DEP: antipsychotics (7/15), antidepressants (4/15); 
anticonvulsants (3/15)
EUTH: antipsychotics (4/13), antidepressants (1/13); 
anticonvulsants (1/13)
Six stories examined ability to appreciate 
first- and second-order false beliefs 
and deceptions. Stories read aloud 
with concurrent presentation cartoon 
drawings depicting action sequences
Impaired first- and second-order ToM 
performance for DEP and MAN even when 
memory controlled for. MAN performance 
worse than DEP. EUTH not impairedDEP: mean age 
45.1 years; 52.5% 
M/47.5% F
EUTH: mean age 
46.8 years; 46.7% 
M/53.3% F
HC: mean age 
36.0 years; 46.7% 
M/53.3% F
Lahera 
et al. (27)
N = 42 
EUTH with 
psychosis; 
N = 33 EUTH 
without 
Psychosis; 
N = 48 HC
DSM-IV-
TR; stable 
outpatients
EUTH with 
psychosis: mean 
age 45.8 years; 
33.3% M/66.7% F
No between-group differences in mean number drugs 
received
Regarding type, EUTH with psychosis received mood 
stabilizer and antipsychotic combination with higher 
frequency than EUTH without
Patients without psychosis on mood stabilizers with 
higher frequency than EUTH with psychosis
The Strange Stories Task Performance similar in bipolar patients with or 
without psychosis. Both impaired relative to 
HC. Impairments partly explained by general 
cognitive deficit
EUTH without 
psychosis: mean 
age 51.2 years; 
48.5% M/51.5% F
HC: mean age 
46.6 years; 33.3% 
M/66.7% F
Martino 
et al. (28)
N = 45 BP1; 
N = 36 BP2; 
N = 34 HC
DSM-IV; 
outpatients
BP1: mean age 
37.2 years; 44.5% 
M/55.5% F
All patients receiving mood stabilizers. Additionally 36% 
were receiving antidepressants, 48% benzodiazepines, 
and 54% antipsychotics. BP had higher exposure 
to antipsychotics than BP2. No differences between 
BP1 and BP2 in exposure to other psychotropic 
medications. BP1 had higher dose antipsychotics BP2 
The Faux Pas test; the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Task
Both BP1 and BP2 impaired relative to 
HC. When neurocognitive impairments 
and exposure to medications controlled, 
performance did not predict whether patient 
or HC. Impaired ToM partly mediated by 
executive function deficits and exposure to 
psychotropic medications
BP2: mean age 
42.9 years; 22.3% 
M; 77.7% F
HC: mean age 
39.7 years; 35.3% 
M/64.7% F
McKinnon 
et al. (29)
N = 14 
BPsub (8 
BP1, 5 BP2, 
1 BPnos); 
N = 14 HC
DSM-IV; in- 
vs. outpatients 
not specified
BPsub: mean age 
47.5 years; 28.6% 
M/71.4% F
All patients receiving medication. Mood stabilizer 
(7/14); anticonvulsants (6/14); antipsychotics (8/14); 
antidepressants (7/14); sedatives (10/14); stimulant 
(1/14)
Custom-made test with scenarios 
describing complex social situations 
such as faux pas, followed by first- and 
second-order ToM questions
Patients impaired on cognitively demanding 
second-order ToM. Reduced performance 
associated with longer illness duration, and 
increased symptom severityHC: mean age 
43.1 years; 35.7% 
M/64.3% F
Montag 
et al. (30)
N = 29 EUTH; 
N = 29 HC
DSM-IV; 
outpatients.
EUTH: mean age 
44.0 years; 34.5% 
M/65.5% F
HC: mean age 
39.7 years; 44.8% 
M/55.2% F
All patients receiving medication. Mood stabilizer 
(9/29); anticonvulsant (17/29); atypical antipsychotic 
(13/29); antidepressant (11/29); sedatives (2/29)
The Movie for the Assessment of Social 
Cognition
EUTH performed worse than HC for cognitive 
ToM, but not for affective ToM. EUTH showed 
higher “undermentalizing” but not higher 
“overmentalizing”. Number manic episodes 
correlated with “undermentalizing” and 
affective ToM
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TABLe 1 | Continued
(Continued)
Study Samplea Diagnostic 
criteria
Participant 
characteristics
Medication details Taskb Key results
Olley 
et al. (31)
N = 15 EUTH 
(BP1); N = 13 
HC
DSM-IV; 
outpatients
EUTH: mean age 
39.2 years; 46.7% 
M/53.3% F
Stable medication regime for 6 weeks. Number of 
years’ exposure to psychotropic medications recorded 
but not reported. Medication effects not examined 
due to different combinations mood stabilizers, 
antidepressants, and antipsychotics
The Strange Stories Task. Also a 
custom-made cartoon comprehension 
task that required ToM to interpret 
correctly
Impaired relative to HC on verbal ToM. 
Although performance comparable to HC 
for non-verbal ToM, responses slower. ToM 
did not correlate with social or occupational 
functioning, but some correlations with 
executive function
HC: mean age 
40.8 years; 46.1% 
M/53.9% F
Purcell 
et al. (32)
N = 29 EUTH; 
N = 28 HC
DSM-IV-TR; 
outpatients
EUTH: mean age 
29.6 years; 35% 
M/65% F
Mean number of psychotropic medications currently 
taken, including anticonvulsants, mood stabilizers, 
antipsychotics, stimulants, antidepressants, and 
sedatives = 2.04
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task EUTH responded faster in comparison to HC. 
Performance accuracy no different though. 
Faster response times predicted increased 
overall life functioning impairmentHC: mean age 
32.1 years; 36% 
M/63% F
Reynolds 
et al. (33)
N = 20 BD; 
N = 20 HC
NB, first-
degree 
relatives of 
patients with 
specified 
DSM-IV-TR 
diagnosis
NB, children of 
mothers with 
specified DSM-IV 
diagnosis
NA The Strange Stories Task; the Picture 
Sequencing Task; the Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes Task
BP impaired on verbal ToM, but not visual or 
higher-order ToM tasks
Schenkel 
et al. (34)
N = 26 BD; 
N = 20 HC
DSM-IV; 
outpatients
BP: mean age 
13.2 years; 62% 
M/38% F
HC: mean age 
13.0 years; 55% 
M/45% F
Medication-free at least 1 week prior to testing Custom-made measure false-belief 
understanding (“Affective Story 
Task”). Stories of emotionally-charged 
situations read aloud, participants 
asked false-belief question to assess 
whether understood potential for 
misunderstanding.
BP impaired relative to HC in positive and 
negative conditions of Affective Story Task. 
BP also worse than HC on Hinting Task. 
Performance associated with younger age, 
earlier illness onset, and manic symptoms
The Hinting Task
Schenkel 
et al. (35)
N = 17 BP1; 
N = 8 BP2; 
N = 25 HC
DSM-IV; 
outpatients.
BP1: mean age 
11.4 years; 58.8% 
M/41.2% F
Majority patients medicated but receiving different 
classes medications (atypical antipsychotics, mood 
stabilizers, or both)
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task; 
the Cognitive and Emotional Perspective 
Taking Task
BD1 worse than HC on Reading Mind in the 
Eyes Task, and cognitive (but not emotional) 
condition of Cognitive and Emotional 
Perspective-Taking TaskBP2: mean age 
13.4 years; 100% 
M/0% F
HC: mean age 
12.4 years; 64% 
M/36% F.
Shamay-
Tsoory 
et al. (36)
N = 19 EUTH 
(BP1); N = 20 
HC.
DSM-IV; 
in- vs. 
outpatients.
EUTH: mean age 
40.2 years; 52.6% 
M/47.4% F
HC: mean age 
32.6 years; 55% 
M/45% F.
All patients receiving medication (mainly mood 
stabilizers), medication intake stable during preceding 
month
The Social Stories Test. Impaired cognitive ToM, but not affective ToM. 
Performance not related to performance of 
neurocognitive tests. Mood stabilizing sub-
groups had no effect on ToM
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TABLe 1 | Continued
(Continued)
Study Samplea Diagnostic 
criteria
Participant 
characteristics
Medication details Taskb Key results
Terrien 
et al. (37)
N = 316 HC Hypomanic 
Personality 
Scale; Beck 
Depression 
Inventory.
HC: mean age 
23.3 years; 20.9% 
M/79.1% F.
NA The Yoni task. Males: mood vitality and excitement sub-scale 
predicted performance
Females: no sub-scales predicted 
performance
Van 
Rheenen 
and 
Rossell 
(38, 39)
N = 49 BP 
(16 DEP, 4 
MAN, 12 MIX, 
17 EUTH; 37 
BD1, 12 BD2); 
N = 48 HC
DSM-IV-TR; 
outpatients
BP: mean age 
38.5 years; 48.5% 
M/51.5% F
Antipsychotics (31/49); antidepressants (15/49); mood 
stabilizers (16/49); sedatives (10/49)
The Picture Sequencing Task BP performed worse than HC for ToM-
relevant false-belief stories, but not on control 
stories. No differences in performance of 
symptomatic vs. euthymic patients, or BD1 
vs. BD2 
HC: mean age 
34.7 years; 58.1% 
M/41.9% F
Van 
Rheenen 
et al. (40)
N = 51 BP; 
N = 52 HC
DSM-IV-TR; 
outpatients.
BP: mean age 
38.5 years; 33.3% 
M/66.7% F
Antipsychotics (33/51); antidepressants (16/51); mood 
stabilizers (16/51); sedatives (10/51)
The Picture Sequencing Task Neurocognition associated with ToM, but 
social cognition not associated with emotion 
regulation
HC: mean age 
34.0 years; 38.5% 
M/61.5% F
Whitney 
et al. (41)
N = 24 BP; 
N = 27 HC
NB, children 
of mothers 
with specified 
DSM-IV 
diagnosis. 
Evidence 
of mood 
dysregulation, 
but not fully 
syndromal BP
BP: mean age 
12.7 years; 54% 
M/46% F
68% lifetime exposure to psychotropic medications ToM subtest of NEPSY II (developmental 
neuropsychological assessment)
No differences between BP and HC
HC: mean age 
13.3 years; 40% 
M/60% F
Wolf et al. 
(42)
N = 33 BP (12 
DEP, 10 MAN, 
11 EUTH); 
N = 29 HC
DSM-IV; in- 
vs. outpatients 
not specified
BP: mean age 
47.7 years; 33.3% 
M/66.7% F
Mood stabilizers (18/33), atypical antipsychotics 
(28/33), antidepressants (15/33)
Comic-strip task based in part on the 
Picture Sequencing Task, in which 
participants sequence cartoon stories 
and asked questions about characters’ 
mental states
BP and all clinical sub-groups impaired on all 
measures, but did not differ from each other 
in most ToM scores. Poorer performance 
on executive tasks did not fully explain 
impairments
HC: mean age 
37.0 years; 34.5% 
M/65.5% F
AFF, affective disorder; BP, bipolar disorder; BP1, bipolar I disorder; BP2, bipolar II disorder; BPnos, bipolar disorder not otherwise specified, BPsub, sub-syndromal bipolar disorder; DEP, depressed bipolar patients, DEPsub, sub-
syndromal depression; DEPmod, moderate depression; EUTH, euthymic bipolar patients; HC, healthy adult controls, MDD, major depressive disorder; MAN, manic bipolar patients; MIX, bipolar patients showing signs of both mania 
and depression.
aPatient groups outside of the bipolar disorders not included.
bNon-theory of mind tasks not included.
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that someone can hold a belief that is different from the actual 
state of affairs is assessed, whereas in a second-order false-belief 
task, participants have to infer the (false) beliefs of one character 
about the (false) beliefs of a second character (49). Kerr et al.’s 
data from such a False Belief Task showed that both groups were 
less able than healthy controls to correctly attribute mistaken 
beliefs about an object’s location to predict or explain someone’s 
behavior. Similarly both patients in manic and depressed phases 
have demonstrated impairments (relative to healthy controls) 
on another classic theory of mind task known as the “Picture 
Sequencing Task”(50), in which participants sequence a series 
of cartoon picture stories that depict cooperation and deception, 
followed by explicit questions about characters’ mental states (42). 
These deficits persisted even when differences in age, intelligence, 
and executive function were accounted for. Elsewhere, mixed 
manic/depressed patients have shown impaired performance 
on a series of theory of mind tasks relative to healthy controls 
(25), including a false-belief task, the “Hinting task” that requires 
participants to infer from a subsequent hint what a character in a 
dialog really meant (51), and the “Faux Pas Recognition Test” (52) 
in which participants have to recognize from a short text when a 
character commits a social error and says something it would be 
better not to say. However, no differences in performance were 
found in exploratory analyses of the effects of mixed/manic mood 
state vs. depressed and euthymic states in another study using the 
Picture Sequencing Task (39). Thus, beyond there being evidence 
of theory of mind impairment across the different symptomatic 
phases, which is suggestive of a potential trait marker, there is 
currently insufficient evidence to support the existence of a 
differential profile of impairment across the depressed, manic, 
hypomanic, or mixed mood states.
A more tractable means of assessing whether theory of mind 
deficits in bipolar disorder represent a trait marker independ-
ent of mood state, has been to adopt the study of remitted or 
asymptomatic patients that are euthymic at the time of testing. 
While one might expect subtler theory of mind impairments 
in euthymic patients, the effects observed are certainly not 
negligible. Two important meta-analytic pieces of work have 
estimated that the effects sizes for theory of mind impairment 
in the euthymic state are in the medium range (0.5 < d < 0.8) 
(8, 48). While the majority of studies of theory of mind in 
euthymic patients have found evidence of impairment (19, 21, 
30, 31), this has not universally been the case. Kerr et al. were 
not able to detect any difference in performance between their 
group of euthymic patients and healthy controls (26). Purcell 
et al. were also unable to detect impaired theory of mind when 
their euthymic patients performed the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task, in which participants attempt to match photos of the 
eye region during facial expressions with the corresponding 
emotional mental state word, thereby constituting a form of 
affective theory of mind (32, 53). Elsewhere, the deficits shown 
by euthymic patients performing the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes affective theory of mind task became non-significant once 
neurocognitive impairments were controlled for (28). Studies of 
theory of mind in the euthymic state are, however, confounded by 
variable definitions of euthymia that have, for example, included 
a score <6 on the Young Mania Rating Scale [YMRS; (54)] and a 
score <7 on the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale [HDRS; (21, 
55)), a HDRS score <14 and a YMRS <5 (30), or a HDRS score 
<12 and YMRS <12 (31). These studies are, thus, potentially 
confounded by residual mood effects. Thus, a distinction has 
thus been made between the performance of “sub-syndromal” 
patients who score >7 but <15 on the HDRS, and truly euthymic 
patients who score <7 on the HDRS, with the performance of the 
former being more impaired than the latter (29). Nevertheless, 
beyond their theoretical importance, socio-cognitive deficits 
during euthymia are of notable clinical significance, given evi-
dence that such disturbances constitute an important obstacle for 
social reintegration and rehabilitation (19).
In the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders classification system (56), the severity of mania expe-
rienced by a patient with bipolar disorder has specific diagnostic 
implications. Patients who have experienced a manic or mixed 
episode that has lasted at least a week, or those who have experi-
enced mania that is so severe that it has required hospitalization, 
are defined as having Bipolar 1 Disorder. By contrast, patients 
who have experienced less-intense elevated (hypomanic) moods, 
but no full-blown manic or mixed episodes, are defined as having 
Bipolar 2 Disorder. Most studies have so far focused on the theory 
of mind impairment in Bipolar 1 Disorder, however, some more 
recent studies have included comparisons between Bipolar 1 and 
Bipolar 2 Disorders on the Picture Sequencing Task, the Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Task, and the Cognitive and Affective 
Perspective Taking Task in which participants assess written 
scenarios and attribute characters’ mental state or belief based 
on cognitive or emotional information (57). So far, none of these 
studies have found any evidence to support a differential theory 
of mind impairment (28, 35, 39).
While differential theory of mind impairment have not yet 
been demonstrated based on categorization of bipolar disorder 
according to severity of mania, links have been found between 
theory of mind impairment and the severity of certain aspects of 
hypomania, e.g., mood lability. Specifically, the study by Terrien 
et al. used the “Yoni task” to assess the ability of healthy adults 
to attribute cognitive and emotional mental states on the basis 
of verbal cues and gaze direction (37). In the Yoni task (58), a 
trial comprises a cartoon outline of the face of a character named 
Yoni, and four colored pictures of objects belonging to a single 
category (e.g., fruits, chairs) or faces, one in each corner of the 
computer screen. The participant’s task is to point to the correct 
answer (the image Yoni is referring to), based on a sentence that 
appears at the top of the screen, and available cues, such as Yoni’s 
eye gaze and Yoni’s facial expression. With this task, Terrien 
et  al. demonstrated that mood volatility showed a relationship 
with theory of mind performance collapsed across cognitive and 
affective theory of mind, but only in men. These findings raise the 
important issue of whether it is possible to detect impaired theory 
of mind in populations at increased risk of developing bipolar 
disorder, either through possession of traits and behaviors related 
to particular clinical dimensions, or through a genetic predisposi-
tion to developing bipolar disorder. Does theory of mind impair-
ment constitute a useful cognitive endophenotype for bipolar 
disorder? In this vein, Reynolds et al. detected impaired theory 
of mind in first-degree relatives of patients with bipolar disorder 
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using the “Strange Stories Task” (59) in which participants read 
a series of stories and answer questions about characters’ mental 
states or physical events (33). However, in another relevant study, 
children and adolescents with a parent with bipolar disorder who 
themselves exhibited some mood dysregulation but did not meet 
the diagnostic criteria for bipolar disorder, appeared unimpaired 
according to a task measuring recognition of mental states and 
identification of false beliefs (41). The predictive value of theory 
of mind impairments in “at risk” populations is, therefore, not 
yet clear (9), and further study of whether this deficit antedates 
bipolar disorder or not is required. Work that searches to identify 
potential “early warning” signs is important, because identifica-
tion of earlier stages of bipolar disorder, prior to the first manic 
episode, may help develop interventions to prevent or delay its 
onset (60).
In this section, we have seen that there is a reasonable level of 
evidence to indicate that theory of mind impairment is a feature 
of all mood states in bipolar disorder, although robust differential 
patterns across the various subtypes are not yet supported. That 
is not necessarily to say that there are no such effects, at this early 
stage in the literature it may simply be that there has not yet been 
enough research. What are now needed are more systematic, 
well-controlled investigations. However, given the existence of 
any evidence of mood-state-related impairments, heterogeneity 
needs to be taken into account in future research (12). Ideally, 
such investigation would be longitudinal and entail a patient 
acting as their own control while experiencing different mood 
states. Via such endeavors, a more well-grounded picture of the 
socio-cognitive profile of bipolar disorder across mood states 
will emerge (31). The recent longitudinal study by Ioannidi et al. 
examining cognitive theory of mind impairment across both 
the remitted and symptomatic state is an excellent start in this 
respect (25). Irrespective of theoretical implications, monitoring 
of theory of mind impairment in euthymic as well as symptomatic 
states has significant clinical value, since it might potentially prove 
a useful indicator of relapse potential in euthymia (9, 15, 37, 42). 
Longitudinal analyses would also provide valuable information 
on the course of impact that theory of mind impairment has. Early 
work already suggests an association between affective theory of 
mind impairment and social functioning 1 year later (32).
Methodological Generalizability
Just as for the heterogeneity of mood states associated with 
bipolar disorder, the tasks used to assess theory of mind are 
heterogeneous in both content and form. To some extent, this 
has been a necessary evil, since theory of mind is not a unitary 
construct (10, 48). Hence in this section, we consider both the 
pattern of differential impairment across different forms of 
theory of mind, and the possible influence of the theory of mind 
test used. It would perhaps be premature to assume that cogni-
tive and affective theory of mind are equally affected by bipolar 
disorder, given the putative evidence for the (partial) separability 
in functional neuroanatomy (61) of these two types, and their 
differing component sub-processes. Indeed, there is evidence 
for differential behavioral impairment in other populations, 
including old age, schizophrenia, autism, and neurodegenerative 
disease (62–64). Using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task 
to index affective theory of mind and the Faux Pas test to index 
cognitive theory of mind, Barrera et  al. directly compared the 
performance of euthymic patients on these two forms of theory 
of mind. Whereas the patients with bipolar disorder did show 
impairment relative to healthy controls on the cognitive theory 
of mind test, they were not impaired on the affective theory of 
mind test (19). Here, the authors argued that the lack of impair-
ment for affective theory of mind might reflect the relative lack 
of mood disturbance in euthymic patients. This suggestion is in 
accord with findings in three more-controlled studies of a greater 
impairment of cognitive theory of mind in bipolar disorder than 
affective theory of mind using questions about feeling vs. think-
ing within the same task (30, 35, 36). However, in the Schenkel 
et al. study, the patients were experiencing an acute episode of 
bipolar disorder, not euthymia (35). Hence, the lack of current 
affective disturbance typically associated with euthymia cannot 
explain the lack of affective theory of mind impairment in that 
study. However, even though the cognitive and affective questions 
comprised part of the same task in the Schenkel et al. study, these 
questions still required different cognitive operations. Whereas 
the affective theory of mind questions required first-order mental 
state understanding and empathy (e.g., “how does the character 
feel”), the cognitive theory of mind questions entailed more 
advanced mental state reasoning and false-belief understanding 
(e.g., “how a character might be misled into believing something 
is false based on false information from someone else”). Therefore 
at present, it cannot be ruled out that differential impairment of 
cognitive vs. affective theory of mind might simply reflect a dif-
ference in degree of complexity or a difference in demand for lin-
guistic processing. Overall, findings from a recent meta-analysis 
of performance of cognitive vs. affective theory of mind tasks by 
patients with bipolar disorder demonstrate that the differences 
noted above have not yet attained statistical significance across 
the body of current literature (48).
Differing processing demands are also relevant to the incon-
sistent impairments according to the tasks used to index the 
ability to make mental state inferences. For example, in one study, 
while patients with Bipolar 1 Disorder showed impairments on 
a first-order false-belief task, the Hinting Task, and the Faux Pas 
Test, only impaired performance on the Faux Pas Test persisted 
when patients later transitioned into euthymia (25). Similarly, 
in another study, first-degree relatives of patients with bipolar 
disorder demonstrated impairment on the Happé Strange Stories 
Test, but not the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task, nor the 
Picture Sequencing Task (33). These differential task-dependent 
impairments have recently been quantified in a task-specific 
meta-analysis. In that work, small but significant effect sizes 
were obtained for differences in performance between patients 
and healthy controls with the Hinting and Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Tasks (0.27 and 0.45, respectively), but a medium effect 
size was obtained for the difference in performance on the Faux 
Pas test (0.58). One of the more common explanations for this 
task-dependency has been differences in the complexity of theory 
of mind processing being assessed (10). False-belief tasks have 
become the gold standard for assessing young children’s under-
standing of mind, but these tasks only index basic mentalizing, 
and for typically developing children, performance is significantly 
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above chance by the age of four (65). Although understanding 
false-beliefs marks an important milestone in theory of mind 
development, it does not equip children with all they need to 
know about people’s lives and minds. Advanced theory of mind 
skills develop later, i.e., during middle childhood and beyond 
(66), and are necessitated by more complex aspects of social inter-
actions. These more advanced forms not only require participants 
to understand differences in belief between characters, but also 
require them to detect and comprehend more subtle constructs, 
such as white lies, jokes, irony, and faux pas. An inter-related 
distinction also used to explain task-dependent impairments of 
theory of mind in bipolar disorder has been that between verbal 
and non-verbal tasks (10). For example, first-degree relatives of 
patients with bipolar disorder have demonstrated impaired ver-
bal theory of mind (on the Happé Strange Stories Task), but no 
impairment on visual theory of mind tasks (Picture Sequencing 
Task, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task) (33). This result was 
explained by the authors as reflecting the more demanding nature 
of the two visual tasks (cognitively and affectively demanding, 
respectively). It is, therefore, a recapitulation of the distinction 
above, albeit in altered form.
A second distinction used to explain task-dependent theory 
of mind impairments is that of decoding vs. reasoning. Whereas 
decoding more closely approximates the perception of mental 
state cues, the latter places higher demands on domain-general 
cognitive resources, such as working memory and executive 
function (9). This particular distinction provides an alternative 
explanation of why some studies might have failed to detect 
impaired affective theory of mind in euthymia, but still have evi-
denced impaired cognitive theory of mind (19, 28). The affective 
theory of mind task used in these two studies – the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Task – is essentially a measure of the ability to 
decode likely emotional state on the basis of perceptual informa-
tion. By contrast, the cognitive theory of mind task – the Faux 
Pas Test – is a much more complex test requiring reasoning about 
whether someone said something that someone else might not 
want to hear. These results, therefore, suggest that perceptually 
based theory of mind impairments may not always be detected, 
while reasoning-based theory of mind impairments may be easier 
to detect.
In this section, we have seen that the results of prior literature 
on theory of mind impairments in bipolar disorder cannot be 
taken at face value without considering the influence of meth-
odological choices such as (i) the level of complexity of theory 
of mind being assessed and (ii) the generic cognitive demands 
of the task used for assessment. In particular, some tasks are 
not able to detect the subtle impairments that might present in 
euthymic patients (31). Therefore in the future, a broader array 
of theory of mind tasks is warranted (35). In research on other 
populations, there have been calls for theory of mind tasks to 
become more ecological in nature and better mimic real-life 
scenarios (3, 67, 68).
Cognitive and Clinical Correlates
In the previous section, it was suggested that the cognitive demand 
of different theory of mind tasks might influence the patterns 
of deficits observed in bipolar disorder. Indeed, a relationship 
between cognitive demand and theory of mind may not be 
surprising given the inherent overlap between neurocognition 
and social cognition (11). So, what are the neuropsychological 
correlates of the theory of mind impairments? There are two 
important aspects to this question, first do impairments persist 
when neurocognitive performance is controlled for, and second, 
how does neurocognitive performance correlate with patients’ 
capacity for theory of mind. Many correlations were reported 
between performance of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task 
and neurocognitive function in the first such study, including 
correlations with sustained attention, verbal fluency, and psy-
chomotor speed (21). Furthermore, global cognitive impairment 
(reduced IQ) has been shown to correlate significantly with 
theory of mind impairment in a recent meta-analysis (48). The 
co-existence of theory of mind impairments with impairments 
of executive functions, such as inhibitory control, has received 
further support from later research with comprehensive neu-
rocognitive batteries (40, 42), and correlations with sustained 
attention impairments seem particularly strong (27). These 
findings co-exist with demonstrations whereby supposed theory 
of mind deficits disappears once differences in neurocognition 
such as attention, verbal memory, and visuo-spatial memory are 
controlled for (25, 28). However, this mediating role for executive 
functions is not a universal finding (33). Furthermore, in theory 
of mind studies that have incorporated matched cognitive control 
conditions, impaired theory of mind does not necessarily co-
occur with impaired performance in that control condition (26, 
39). Questions, therefore, remain as to why this relationship is 
not universal. Careful more extensive research with well-powered 
samples is required, perhaps with neurocognitive tests that more 
specifically assess individual domains of executive function (31).
We next turn to consider clinical correlates of theory of mind 
impairments in bipolar disorder. Here, the evidence is patchy, 
inconsistent, and incomplete, although currently available evi-
dence does not favor reliable links with basic clinical variables 
(48). The only positive findings that exist so far are a possible 
association between performance of theory of mind tasks and 
illness duration (29, 42). Taken at face value, this suggests that 
theory of mind impairment is progressive, and that further study 
might be wise to determine in which direction the effects occur. 
However, elsewhere demonstration of this association has not 
been repeated (28), and meta-analysis of the links between socio-
cognitive impairment and length of illness in bipolar disorder 
suggests that there is insufficient evidence to take the relation-
ship between theory of mind impairment and illness duration 
seriously (12). Other attempts to link basic clinical variables with 
theory of mind impairment in bipolar disorder have failed to find 
support for an association with the number of illness episodes 
experienced (21, 28, 29), or age of onset (21, 29, 42).
Perhaps more surprising has been the failure to find support 
for the impact of theory of mind impairment on social function-
ing as discussed elsewhere for other psychiatric disorders (11, 
18, 69, 70). In the first study of this type, although patients with 
bipolar disorder in remission were impaired on a verbal theory 
of mind measure, the impairments showed no relationship with 
social and occupational functioning as indexed by the Life 
Functioning Questionnaire (31). Generalizability was widened 
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with the demonstration by Barrera et al. using different theory 
of mind and social functioning measures in which they observed 
that neither scores on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task nor 
scores on the Faux Pas Test correlated with global functioning 
according to the Functioning Assessment Short Test (19). These 
two studies did, however, test euthymic patients, who are perhaps 
less likely to show sizeable functional impairments relative to 
symptomatic patients, and both assessed only a small sample of 
patients (N = 12 and N = 15, respectively). Yet similar patterns 
have emerged in larger datasets from symptomatic patients. In 
a study by Cusi et  al., performance on the Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes Task did not correlate with any social domain on 
the Social Adjustment Self-Report Scale in a mixed sample of 
Bipolar 1 Disorder patients with varying levels of depressive 
symptoms (22). Furthermore, a subsequent study by Benito et al. 
uncovered no evidence for an association between performance 
of the Hinting Task and global functioning according to the 
Functioning Assessment Short Test (20). However, a prospective 
study by Purcell et al. produced the interesting finding that abnor-
mally short response times on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Task predicted greater life functioning impairment as assessed by 
the Life Functioning Questionnaire (32). Thus, while theory of 
mind impairment might not predict concurrent social function-
ing, it may be able to predict the likelihood of further decline. 
Alternatively, as suggested by the authors, since the prospective 
relationship was with response times on the theory of mind 
task rather than accuracy, it may be the case that quick mental 
state inferences are more helpful in understanding functional 
impairment.
As lamented by others (10), only a handful of studies have 
investigated the potential influences of medication on theory of 
mind performance, such as duration of exposure, dose effects, 
or the type of medication being taken. Yet, as can be seen from 
Table  1, the medication profile of participant samples is often 
markedly heterogeneous, both across- and within-studies, 
and receipt of multiple medications is common. This poses a 
major potential confound. Often studies are underpowered to 
make statistical comparisons of the effects of different classes 
of medication, analyses are cursory and retrospective, with 
possible medication effects frequently being cited as study 
limitations. This has, in part, resulted from the challenges 
associated with accessing unmedicated samples of patients 
with bipolar disorder and from variations in medication profile 
inherent to the heterogeneity of bipolar disorder. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the results of ad  hoc analyses have been negative 
where attempted. Shamay-Tsoory et  al. divided their patients 
into three groups according to the medications being received: 
lithium (N = 9), carbamazepine (N = 6), and sodium valproate 
(N = 4). However, these three sub-groups did not differ in either 
cognitive or affective theory of mind performance (36). Post hoc 
analyses by Van Rheenen et al. also failed to detect an influence 
on theory of mind performance according to whether a patient 
was on vs. off antipsychotics, antidepressants, mood stabilizers, 
or benzodiazepines (39). Elsewhere, among people at high-risk 
for bipolar disorder, previous lifetime exposure to psychotropic 
medication (self-report) has also been shown not to influence 
theory of mind performance (41). A more definitive study by 
Bora et al. examined correlations between serum lithium levels 
and theory of mind performance on both the Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes Task and the Hinting Task in euthymic patients with 
Bipolar 1 Disorder, but did not detect any such relationship (21). 
Medication effects on theory of mind have also been quantified 
and compared, using the Clinical Scale of Intensity, Frequency, 
and Duration of Psychopharmacological Treatment, to index cur-
rent exposure to different classes of medication on a scale from 0 
to 5. While that study also failed to find evidence of medication 
effects in either Bipolar 1 or Bipolar 2 disorder on the Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Task, a significant correlation was observed 
with performance on the Faux Pas test (28). Furthermore, once 
exposure to benzodiazepines was controlled for, performance on 
the Faux Pas test no longer allowed the prediction of whether a 
participant was a patient or healthy control. There is currently a 
lack of optimism as to whether psychotropic medications, such 
as those prescribed for bipolar disorder, improve social cognition 
(71, 72). However, as to whether these drugs worsen social cogni-
tions, such as theory of mind, further research is required.
In this section, we have seen evidence that theory of mind 
impairment often co-exists alongside cognitive impairments, 
particularly those relating to executive functions. Furthermore, 
some of these cognitive impairments correlate with, or predict, 
the degree of theory of mind impairment. Thus, there is now a 
sufficient evidence base to warrant further investigation to flesh 
out our understanding of the relationship between the two, and 
how the mechanism of effects fits together (7, 10). For both thera-
peutic purposes and theoretical reasons, it is particularly impor-
tant to establish whether theory of mind impairment in bipolar 
disorder is primary in origin, or simply secondary to cognitive 
impairment. Regarding medication effects on theory of mind, not 
only are they of interest in their own right, but they also present 
an important confound to the comparison of results from prior 
studies (8). Yet, often studies only provide broad information on 
the drug classes being received, without identifying the name of 
the specific medicine being received. This needs to be rectified, 
although the separate effects of specific drugs will always be 
difficult to tease apart where patients are concurrently in receipt 
of multiple medications. Regarding clinical correlates, theory 
of mind studies in bipolar disorder are now accumulating, but 
they do not always examine the relation between social cognition 
and clinical variables (10). Future research that focused on core 
issues, concerning the evolution of theory of mind impairment 
in response to changes in clinical course, could enable more 
responsive, dynamic, and individualized patient care in social 
and occupational contexts (22).
Clinical implications and Next Steps
It has been recognized for some time now that establishing a clear 
pattern of theory of mind deficits in bipolar disorder may have 
profound implications for the clinical management of patients. 
Difficulties in understanding the mental state of others can result 
in the misreading of social cues, resulting in a reduced ability 
to accurately comprehend social interactions (73). Patients with 
impaired theory of mind are, therefore, unlikely to understand 
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the impact of their behavior on others, and this may contribute 
to their willingness to indulge in reckless or dangerous activities 
(74, 75). Moreover, difficulty in understanding the perspective of 
others may be an impediment to some psychological interven-
tions (76, 77). Regarding the next phase of research, we make 
the following suggestions. First, the adoption of standardized 
task design would be prudent where possible, as has become 
commonplace for the study of child populations (78, 79), or as 
afforded by well-validated tests, e.g., “The Awareness of Social 
Inference Test” (80, 81), which has been extensively normed 
across adolescent, young- and middle-aged populations, and 
assessed for reliability, practice effects, and education- and 
IQ-independent consistency. This latter test assesses the ability 
to perceive social inferences both with (minimal context) and 
without the benefit of additional information revealing the 
protagonist’s true thoughts or feelings (enriched context), in 
order to assess whether participants are able to integrate and 
use explicit contextual information regarding speaker beliefs. 
Second, comprehensive neuropsychological batteries should be 
administered routinely alongside the theory of mind paradigms, 
e.g., the International Society for Bipolar Disorders-Battery for 
Assessment of Neurocognition (ISBD-BANC) (82), to separate 
out the effects of cognitive impairment and theory of mind 
impairment. Third, further research should adopt more ecologi-
cal theory of mind tests, e.g., incorporating video-based material 
or virtual reality scenarios (68, 83). We do not suggest that these 
should replace use of the controlled simplistic tasks currently 
in use, as these have the capacity to isolate specific individual 
aspects of the impairment. On the other hand, although percep-
tion of cues from isolated modalities is of theoretical interest, 
such an approach lacks the ecological validity of multi-modal 
cues in naturalistic settings. In some populations, e.g., older 
adults, it has even been demonstrated that impairments of social 
cognition are reduced in magnitude when more life-like assess-
ments are used (84, 85). Related to this is the predominant use 
of static photographs at present. By contrast, dynamic stimuli 
are also ecologically valid and are information-rich, which 
facilitates more accurate understanding (86–89). Evaluating the 
performance of patients with bipolar disorder when responding 
to theory of mind cues in more realistic situations will allow us 
to better understand how these impairments might translate into 
impairments in daily living. For example, the video modality 
adopted by Montag et  al. for the purposes of evaluating more 
subtle impairments, in which participants view a film showing 
two women and two men spending an evening together, with the 
instruction to try to understand the feelings, thoughts, and inten-
tions of the characters, for the purposes of answering a series of 
multiple-choice questions (30). Fourth, more longitudinal stud-
ies are needed. In addition to the benefits discussed earlier, this 
endeavor would facilitate a better understanding of whether the 
deficits are static or progressive, which has important implica-
tions for characterizing the natural history of bipolar disorder, its 
clinical management, and more accurate prediction of the likely 
functional deficits ahead. This might be enhanced by parallel 
studies of changes in functional neuroanatomy over time, to help 
establish the underlying mechanisms of change (23).
COMPARATive ASSeSSMeNTS OF 
THeORY OF MiND iN BiPOLAR DiSORDeR 
AND SCHiZOPHReNiA
In terms of the type of symptoms within bipolar disorder that 
might associate with theory of mind impairments, there have 
been a number of suggestions, including impulsivity (14, 32) 
and affect (21, 29). However, the most prevalent discussions have 
centered on a possible association with psychotic symptoms or 
history of psychosis. Indeed, it has been claimed that theory of 
mind impairment is characteristic of all the major psychoses, 
irrespective of diagnosis (13, 90). This makes sense given the 
partial overlap in symptoms across schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder (91–93), and the common occurrence of psychosis in 
the manic state (94–96). The hypothesis that theory of mind 
impairments might present in both schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder is further motivated by the partial overlap in genetic 
basis between the two disorders (97, 98). Therefore, we now turn 
to more substantive methodology, and evaluate theory of mind 
studies that have directly compared patients with diagnoses of 
bipolar disorder against those with diagnoses of schizophrenia. 
We summarize reports of direct comparisons of theory of mind 
impairment in these two patient groups in Table 2. Here, we do 
not seek to serve a review of literature on theory of mind impair-
ments in schizophrenia per  se. For that the interested reader is 
referred to works elsewhere (99–103).
Relative Scale of impairment
One of the most prominent issues among studies, comparing 
performance on theory of mind tasks across bipolar disorder 
and schizophrenia, is the question of whether the impairments 
are of equal magnitude. The use of traditional theory of mind 
tests, such as the Reading the Mind in the Eyes and the Faux Pas 
Tests, provides some evidence that the impairments observed in 
schizophrenia might be greater than those in patients with bipolar 
disorder (16, 105). However, the results are not always positive. In 
one study, no differences in performance were observed between 
patients with schizophrenia vs. bipolar disorder performing the 
Happé Strange Stories task (112). Similarly, while patients with 
schizophrenia, and bipolar patients with and without psychosis 
all showed deficits on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes and 
Hinting tasks, the level of impairment for each task was similar 
across the three patient groups (115). One explanation is that if 
the theory of mind impairment is linked to current psychosis, the 
deficit should show a relationship to symptom severity irrespec-
tive of diagnosis, and therefore between-group differences might 
not necessarily be expected. There is certainly some supporting 
evidence for this (90, 109).
A second explanation for the variable support for theory 
of mind impairments being greater for schizophrenia than for 
bipolar disorder is that as mentioned above, these simple tests 
lack ecological validity (107), which has promoted other studies 
wishing to compare the impairments in schizophrenia and bipo-
lar disorder to use more ecological tests. Here, the evidence for 
greater impairment in schizophrenia is more convincing, which 
TABLe 2 | Overview of theory of mind research in studies assessing patients with bipolar disorder with direct comparison to patients with schizophrenia.
Study Samplea Diagnostic 
criteria
Participant characteristics Details of medication supplied ToM Taskb Key results
Bazin 
et al. (104)
N = 15 MAN; 
N = 12 DEP; N = 15 
SCHIZ; N = 12 HC
DSM-IV; 
stable 
outpatients
MAN: mean age 36.1 years; 86.7% 
M/13.3% F
MAN/DEP: mood stabilizers, antipsychotics 
and/or antidepressants
SCHIZ: antipsychotics
The Versailles-Situational 
Intention Reading task (V-SIR): 
video excerpts depicting 
complex real-life scenes social 
interactions. Also non-verbal 
comic-strip task (see Sarfati 
entry below)
MAN impaired relative to HC. 
Performance of MAN and DEP 
not distinguishable. Trend toward 
SCHIZ performing worse than 
MAN. No effect of group for comic-
strip task
DEP: mean age 46.7 years; 50% M/50% F
SCHIZ: mean age 35.4 years; 12M/3F
HC: mean age 30.1 years; 5M/10F
Caletti 
et al. (105)
N = 18 EUTH (10 
BP1, 8 BP2); N = 30 
SCHIZ; N = 18 HC
DSM-IV-TR; 
outpatients
EUTH: mean age 42.2 years; 22.2% 
M/77.8% F
SCHIZ: mean age 42.5; 80% M/20% F
HC: mean age 36.1; 33.3% M/66.7% F
EUTH: atypical antipsychotic (16/18); typical 
antipsychotic (3/18); mood stabilizer (18/18); 
antidepressant (8/18); sedative (5/18)
The Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task; the Faux Pas test 
Both SCHIZ and EUTH performed 
worse than HC. SCHIZ performed 
worse than EUTH in both tasks
SCHIZ: atypical antipsychotic (19/30); typical 
antipsychotic (11/30); Mood stabilizer (4/30); 
antidepressant (2/30); sedative (8/30)
Donohoe 
et al. (16)
N = 132 BP; 
N = 208 SCHIZ; 
N = 132 HC 
DSM-IV; 
outpatients
BP: mean age 44.8 years; 54.5% 
M/45.5% F
BP: 269.8 mg chlorpromazine equivalents
SCHIZ: 555.9 mg chlorpromazine equivalents
The Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task; the Hinting Task
BP impaired on Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes Task; performance 
comparable to SCHIZ. More subtle 
impairment in BP relative to SCHIZ 
for Hinting Task
SCHIZ: mean age 41.1 years; 72.3% 
M/27.7% F
HC: mean age 37.5 years; 39.9% 
M/60.1% F
Doody 
et al. (106)
N = 12 AFF (10 
MDD/2 DEP); 
N = 28 SCHIZ. 
No HC
DSM-
III-R. BP: 
inpatients; 
SCHIZ 
outpatients
AFF: mean age 42.3 years, 8.3%  
M/91.7% F
Not specified The Sally-Anne Task (first-order 
ToM); the Ice-Cream Van Test 
(second-order ToM)
Both SCHIZ and AFF performed 
Sally-Anne Task normally. SCHIZ 
impaired on Ice-Cream Van Test, 
but not AFF
SCHIZ: mean age 46.3 years; 60.7% 
M/39.3% F
HC: mean age 20.4 years; 45% M/55% F
Guastella 
et al. (90)
N = 40 BP; N = 23 
SCHIZ/FEP/SAD. 
No HC
DSM-IV-
TR; stable 
outpatients
BP: mean age 21.7 years; 27% M/73% F
SCHIZ/FEP/SAD: mean age 22.8 years; 
83% M/17% F
BP: antipsychotic (24/40); antidepressant 
(24/40); mood stabilizer (16/40)
The Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task
SCHIZ/FEP/SAD more impaired 
than BP. Across diagnostic 
groups, performance correlated 
with psychotic but not affective 
symptoms
SCHIZ/FEP/SAD: antipsychotic (20/23); 
antidepressant (3/23); mood stabilizer (1/23)
Lahera 
et al. (107)
N = 46 BP; N = 49 
SCHIZ; N = 50 HC
DSM-IV-
TR; stable 
outpatients
BP: mean age 38.6 years; 37% M/63% F BP and SCHIZ: receiving unspecified 
pharmacological treatment
The Hinting Task SCHIZ performed worse than BP 
and HC. BP also worse than HCSCHIZ: mean age 40.4 years; 57.1% 
M/42.9% F
HC: mean age 43.3 years; 42% M/58% F
Lee et al. 
(108)
N = 68 BP (52 
EUTH); N = 38 
SCHIZ; N = HC
DSM-IV; 
stable 
outpatients
BP: mean age 43.9 years; 54.4% 
M/45.6% F
SCHIZ: mean age 44.7 years; 55.3% 
M/44.7% F
HC: mean age 41.4 years; 55.6% 
M/44.4% F
BP: antipsychotic (41/68); lithium (13/68)
SCHIZ: antipsychotic (38/38)
The Awareness of Social 
Inference Test
On lie and sarcasm sub-scales, 
BP not impaired relative to HC, but 
SCHIZ performed better than BP 
and SCHIZ
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(Continued)
Study Samplea Diagnostic 
criteria
Participant characteristics Details of medication supplied ToM Taskb Key results
Marjoram 
et al. (109)
N = 15 AFF (7 BP, 
8 MDD); N = 15 
SCHIZ; N = 15 HC
DSM-IV; 
mixed 
inpatients and 
outpatients
AFF: mean age 41.7 years; 40% M/60% F
SCHIZ: mean age 28.3 years; 86.7% 
M/13.3% F
HC: mean age 34.3 years; 66.7% 
M/33.3% F
AFF: antidepressant only (9/15); antidepressant 
and typical antipsychotic (5/15); antidepressant 
and atypical antipsychotic (1/15)
The Hinting Task BP not impaired relative to 
HC. SCHIZ worse than HC 
and AFF. Across diagnostic 
groups, performance correlated 
with psychotic (delusions and 
hallucinations) but not negative 
symptoms
SCHIZ: typical antipsychotic only (4/15); 
typical antipsychotic and anticholinergic (5/15); 
atypical antipsychotic only (5/15); atypical 
antipsychotic and anticholinergic
Maróthi 
and Kéri 
(110)
N = 23 BP; N = 28 
SCHIZ; N = 29 HC.
NB, children 
of mothers 
with specified 
DSM-IV 
diagnosis
BP: mean age 10.8 years; 78.3% 
M/21.7% F
N/A The Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task
SCHIZ impaired, but BP no 
different to HC
SCHIZ: mean age 10.6 years; 71.4% 
M/28.5% F
HC: mean age 10.6 years; 55.2% 
M/44.8% F
Pawlby 
et al. (111)
N = 23 DEP; N = 12 
MAN; N = 15 
SCHIZ; N = 49 HC
DSM-IV; 
inpatients on 
mother and 
baby unit
DEP: mean age 32.2 years; 100% F Not specified, but mothers undergoing current 
treatment for a psychiatric condition excluded
Five-minute video recordings 
of unstructured play session 
with baby coded
Relative to HD, DEP less likely to 
comment on baby’s mental state. 
SCHIZ interactional behavior no 
different to HC
MAN: mean age 29.0 years; 100% F
SCHIZ: mean age 30.5 years; 100% F
HC: mean age 30.5 years; 100% F
Rossell 
and Van 
Rheenen 
(112)
N = 28 MAN; 
N = 30 SCHIZ; 
N = 29 HC 
DSM-IV; 
mixed 
inpatients and 
outpatients
MAN: mean age 38.3 years; 40% M/60% 
F
SCHIZ: mean age 36.5 years; 63.3% 
M/36.7% F
HC: mean age 35.9 years; 65.5% 
M/34.5% F
MAN: mood stabilizer (5/28); atypical 
antipsychotic (5/28); typical antipsychotic 
(1/28); mood stabilizer and atypical 
antipsychotic (8/28); mood stabilizer and 
antidepressant (4/28); typical antipsychotic 
and atypical antipsychotic and anticonvulsant 
(1/28); atypical antipsychotic and 
antidepressant (1/28); anticonvulsant and 
antidepressant (1/28); no medication (3/28)
The Strange Stories Task Both patient groups equally 
impaired. Reduced ToM 
performance correlated with 
delusion severity in MAN only
SCHIZ: atypical antipsychotics (21/30); typical 
antipsychotics (7/30); no medication (2/30)
Rowland 
et al. (113)
N = 33 BP1; N = 56 
SCHIZ; N = 58 HC
DSM-IV; 
outpatients
BP1: mean age 40.7 years; 54.3% 
M/45.7% F
SCHIZ: mean age 44.6 years; 57.1% 
M/42.9% F
HC: mean age 33.9%; 50% M/50% F
BP1: antipsychotic (2/33); mood stabilizer 
(7/33); antipsychotic and mood stabilizer 
(10/33); antidepressant and mood stabilizer 
(7/33); antipsychotic and antidepressant and 
mood stabilizer (2/33)
SCHIZ: antipsychotic (18/56); antipsychotic 
and antidepressant (18/56); antipsychotic 
and mood stabilizer (5/56); antipsychotic and 
antidepressant and mood stabilizer (7/56)
The Awareness of Social 
Inference Test
Both BP1 and SCHIZ impaired, 
SCHIZ worse than BP1
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(Continued)
Study Samplea Diagnostic 
criteria
Participant characteristics Details of medication supplied ToM Taskb Key results
Sarfati 
and 
Hardy-
Bayle 
(114)
N = 10 MAN; 
N = 15 SCHIZ with 
disorganization; 
N = 10 SCHIZ 
without 
disorganization; 
N = 15 HC
DSM-IV; 
inpatients 
MAN: mean age 33.9 years; 60% M/40% 
F
MAN: antipsychotic (9/10)
SCHIZ: antipsychotic (24/25)
No difference in dose between groups
Custom-made comic-strip 
task; participants select card 
(from four) most likely to be 
last cartoon drawing
No impairments in MAN. SCHIZ 
with disorganization performed 
worstSCHIZdis: mean age 35.7 years; 33.3% 
M/66.7% F
SCHIZnodis: mean age 29.2 years; 20% 
M/80% F
HC: mean age 28.6 years; 33.3% 
M/66.7% F
Thaler 
et al. (115)
N = 24 BP1 with 
psychosis; N = 24 
BP1 without 
psychosis; N = 30 
SCHIZ; N = 24 HC
DSM-IV; 
stable 
patients, but 
inpatients vs. 
outpatients 
not specified
BP1 with psychosis: mean age 37.6 years; 
25%M/75% F
BP1 without psychosis: mean age 
34.1 years; 42% M/58% F
BP1 with psychosis: antipsychotic (14/24); 
anticonvulsant (13/24); antidepressant (10/24); 
mood stabilizer (5/24)
The Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task; the Hinting Task
All clinical groups performed worse 
than HC, but at similar level to one 
another
BP1 without psychosis: antipsychotic (8/24); 
anticonvulsant (8/24); antidepressant (10/24); 
mood stabilizer (2/24)
SCHIZ: mean age 47.9 years; 66% 
M/33% F
SCHIZ: antipsychotic (29/30); anticonvulsant 
(19/30); antidepressant (13/30); mood stabilizer 
(2/30)HC: mean age 36.1 years; 46% M/54% F
Thaler 
et al. (116)
N = 24 BP with 
psychosis; N = 24 
BP without 
psychosis; N = 30 
SCHIZ. No HC.
DSM-IV; 
stable 
patients, but 
inpatients vs. 
outpatients 
not specified.
BP1 with psychosis: mean age 37.6 years; 
25%M/75% F
BP1 without psychosis: mean age 
34.1 years; 42% M/58% F
SCHIZ: mean age 47.9 years; 66% 
M/33% F
BP with psychosis: antipsychotic (8/24); 
anticonvulsant (8/24); antidepressant (10/24); 
mood stabilizer (2/24)
The Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Task; the Hinting Task.
ToM only predicted functional 
capacity for SCHIZ.
BP without psychosis: antipsychotic (14/24); 
anticonvulsant (13/24); antidepressant (10/24); 
mood stabilizer (5/24)
SCHIZ: antipsychotic (29/30); anticonvulsant 
(19/30); antidepressant (13/30); mood stabilizer 
(2/30)
AFF, affective disorder; BP, bipolar disorder; BP1, bipolar I disorder; BP2, bipolar II disorder; DEP, depressed bipolar patients, DYS, Dysthymia; EUTH, euthymic bipolar patients; FEP, First-episode Psychosis; HC, healthy adult controls, 
MAN, manic bipolar patients, SAD, Schizoaffective Disorder; SCHIZ, patients with schizophrenia.
aPatient groups outside of the bipolar disorders and the psychoses not included.
bNon-theory of mind tasks not included.
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implies that patients with schizophrenia might only show greater 
theory of mind impairments than those in bipolar disorder on 
more demanding or more life-like tests (108, 113). The Versailles-
Situational Intention Reading task (V-SIR) also comprises video 
excerpts, and requires participants to rate the probabilities of 
affirmations of the intentions of different characters. With this 
task, a similar story emerges, and patients with schizophrenia 
again showed greater deficits than patients with bipolar disorder, 
but while the difference between schizophrenic and depressed 
patients was significant, the difference between schizophrenic 
and manic patients was not quite significant (104).
Symptomatic and Cognitive Mediators of 
the Differences
Given that patients with schizophrenia are sometimes more 
impaired than patients with bipolar disorder, the question 
becomes what is driving these differences? In cross-diagnosis 
theory of mind studies, differences between the patients with 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder with respect to various basic 
clinical factors often occur, including substance abuse (105) and 
number of hospitalizations (115). Beyond striving to match such 
basic clinical variables, another important target is to match for 
generic severe mental illness pathology, so that any differences in 
theory of mind impairment can then be attributed to the disorders 
themselves rather than generic differences in symptom severity. 
When theory of mind in patients with schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder have been analyzed taking account of broad symptom 
variables, such as depression, positive, and negative symptoms, 
these types of factors are not always significant predictors of 
impairment (108, 116). Moreover, differences in theory of mind 
performance often remain significant after statistically control-
ling for differences in these broad measures (16).
Matching for level of positive symptoms at the recruitment 
rather than statistical analysis stage has further facilitated evalua-
tion of theory of mind impairment according to disorder. When 
this approach was adopted, patients with schizophrenia still 
showed a greater theory of mind impairment than patients with 
bipolar disorder (112), implying that factors other than psychosis 
must also contribute to differences in performance between the 
patient groups. Yet weight to a cross-diagnostic link between 
theory of mind impairment and specific positive symptoms has 
been provided by Marjoram et  al., who evidenced such a rela-
tionship across patients with schizophrenia and a mixed group 
of patients with unipolar or bipolar depression. Rather than 
the theory of mind impairment being disease specific and only 
occurring in patients with schizophrenia, they observed a cross-
diagnostic symptom-specific relationship between performance 
of the Hinting task and positive symptoms as indexed by severity 
of hallucinations/delusions (109). A similar story emerges from 
other comparisons, such as the demonstration by Guastella et al. 
that performance of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test was 
a strong predictor of global positive symptoms across patients 
with likely psychotic vs. bipolar illness (90). Interestingly, when 
the theory of mind performance of patients with schizophrenia 
who did vs. did not show evidence of thought disorder (another 
positive symptom) was compared to the performance of patients 
with bipolar disorder, it was only performance of the schizo-
phrenic patients with thought disorder that was impaired relative 
to healthy controls (114). The performance of the patients with 
schizophrenia without thought disorder was comparable to that 
of patients with bipolar disorder, again suggesting a link between 
theory of mind impairment and specific symptoms of psychosis, 
rather than a general increase in impairment in schizophrenia.
Thus, there may be two co-existing patterns of results, namely 
a symptom-specific relationship between theory of mind impair-
ment and certain positive symptoms that are independent of 
diagnosis, and another unidentified cause of the differences. As 
to what the likely cause is of this other unidentified contribution 
to the differences, there are a number of candidates. Attributional 
style has been explored in patients with schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder, and while both groups showed evidence of hostile socio-
cognitive biases, theory of mind impairment on the Hinting Task 
was still greater in patients with schizophrenia than those with 
bipolar disorder, thus ruling attribution style out as a possible 
mediator (107). Emotion regulation has also been investigated. 
While patients with schizophrenia showed significantly greater 
theory of mind impairment than those with bipolar disorder, 
and distinct patterns of cognitive strategies were used to regulate 
emotion in the two patient groups (schizophrenia: more likely to 
engage in catastrophizing and rumination; bipolar disorder: more 
likely to blame themselves and less likely to engage in positive 
reappraisal), associations between theory of mind performance 
and affect regulation were not observed in either group (113). On 
the possibility of whether differences in medication dose or type 
between patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder influ-
ence differences in theory of mind impairment, variability and 
multiplicity in the medications being taken, makes comparison 
of respective medication effects difficult (112, 116). However, 
it is perhaps unlikely that medication differences might drive 
differences in theory of mind performance. First, antipsychotic 
equivalence dosage appears to have no effect on theory of mind 
performance, i.e., there is no evidence of correlation between the 
two (16, 109, 114). Second, use of antipsychotic medication did 
not alter the predictive power of performance on the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Test in relation to severity of positive symptoms 
(90). Third, when the theory of mind performance of bipolar 
patients taking antipsychotics is compared to the performance of 
bipolar patients not taking antipsychotics, no significant differ-
ences were observed (108).
Another potential mediator of differences in theory of mind 
performance worthy of consideration is the differences in cogni-
tive impairment between these two patient groups (117–119). 
This is a factor that comparative studies of theory of mind 
across bipolar disorder and schizophrenia do not always control 
for, leaving the door open for differences in cognitive function 
between the two groups to confound differences in theory of mind 
impairment. In the direct comparative literature, both differences 
in theory of mind impairment and in cognitive function in the 
verbal memory, episodic memory, working memory, attentional, 
visual learning, reasoning, and processing speed domains have 
been shown to co-exist in patients with schizophrenia vs. bipolar 
disorder, but the impact of specific cognitive differences on dif-
ferences in theory of mind performance have not been analyzed 
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(16, 105, 108). The evidence for a differential influence of general 
cognitive ability initially appears a little stronger, since IQ has 
been shown to correlate with performance of the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes Test in patients with schizophrenia but not in 
patients with bipolar disorder, and vice versa for performance of 
the Hinting Task (16). However, the inclusion of IQ when analyz-
ing differences in theory of mind does not tend to change the 
pattern of differences observed for the two disorders (16, 112).
The implications of Differential 
impairments
In the literature focusing exclusively on bipolar disorder, moves 
to link the experience of psychosis with increased theory of mind 
impairment, although derived from a strong rationale, have not 
yet been particularly productive. Bora et al. found no impact of 
history of psychosis on performance of the Hinting Task when 
comparing 26 patients with such a history to 17 patients with no 
past history, but at the time of testing the patients were euthymic 
(21). However, in another study, performance of that task by 
symptomatic patients showed no difference between patients 
with and without past history of psychosis (20). The same pattern 
has been noted for other theory of mind tests, such as the Happé 
Strange Stories Task (27), and for the relationship of history of 
psychosis to cognitive and affective theory of mind (19), and for 
both Bipolar 1 and Bipolar 2 Disorders (28). It might, therefore, 
be concluded that theory of mind deficits do not constitute a 
vulnerability marker for psychosis. However, in schizophrenia 
itself, theory of mind deficits lessen when patients are in 
remission (101, 120). Thus, seeking to link deficits to a history 
of psychosis once bipolar patients are no longer experiencing 
psychosis may be less likely to succeed than if testing patients 
currently experiencing psychosis. We might not yet be using the 
most optimal methods to evaluate the research questions being 
pursued in this field.
In the first part of this review, we considered whether theory 
of mind impairment could be a trait marker for bipolar disorder 
across different mood states. Here, the question is could a theory 
of mind impairment go one step further, and serve as a useful 
cognitive endophenotype of proneness to psychosis? There are 
certainly examples of non-social cognition being accepted as can-
didate endophenotypes for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia 
(121, 122), and if theory of mind impairments prove to be an 
endophenotype for the psychoses, this knowledge could ulti-
mately aid in efforts to identify risk-related genes for this group 
of disorders, as well as in prevention and early intervention. At 
present, yes theory of mind impairments are present in both 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, but attempts to link these 
findings as originating from a common (genetic) cause have not 
yet been as successful as was hoped (108). It remains to be proven 
unequivocally that theory of mind impairment in bipolar disor-
der and schizophrenia occurs specifically because the two are 
both types of psychosis (108). Future studies might benefit from 
expanding the comparisons to explore theory of mind impair-
ment in other related disorders, such as schizoaffective disorder, 
schizophreniform disorder, and schizotypal personality disorder 
(13, 123).
Despite the uncertain nature of the association of theory of 
mind impairment across the two affective and non-affective 
psychoses, given the potential for socio-cognitive deficits to 
impact on social and occupational function, their comparison 
remains important, because it may partly explain differences 
in outcome between the disorders (16). For this same reason, 
reliably identified differences among diagnoses may be crucial 
to pinpoint treatment planning, medication management, and 
long-term patient care (115). Establishing differences in social 
functioning might also be indicative of the likely success of reme-
diation through recent socio-cognitive training schemes that aim 
to improve abilities, such as theory of mind (124–127). It has 
been claimed that socio-cognitive impairments, such as theory 
of mind, may be less of a determinant of functioning in bipolar 
disorder than in schizophrenia, and therefore that non-social 
cognitive remediation may be better suited for bipolar disorder 
(108). However, there has been little direct comparison of the 
links between theory of mind impairment and social functioning 
in the two patient groups. In the study by Caletti et al., patients 
with bipolar disorder showed greater social functioning accord-
ing to the DSM General Assessment of Functioning Scale (56), 
level of functioning was then shown to correlate with theory of 
mind score, and impairments on the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test and Faux Pas Test were worse in schizophrenia than 
in bipolar disorder (105). It can be inferred from these data that 
the impact of theory of mind impairment on functioning that 
patients with schizophrenia experience might be greater than 
that experienced in bipolar disorder, simply because they have a 
greater theory of mind deficit. Although the correlations were not 
examined separately in each patient group, this was performed 
in a separate study in which better theory of mind performance 
predicted better functioning, but only for the patients with 
schizophrenia, not for those with bipolar disorder (116). So, the 
early signs are that theory of mind impairment does indeed have 
more of an impact on everyday functioning in schizophrenia than 
in bipolar disorder.
CONCLUSiON
This theoretical review has attempted to synthesize the existing 
data examining the ability of people with bipolar disorder to 
deduce the feelings and intentions of other minds via “theory of 
mind,” and what has been learned from the comparative study vs. 
the abilities of people with schizophrenia. In drawing the literature 
together, a number of themes were identified. In part one, these 
included the generalizability of impairments across different pres-
entations of bipolar disorder, changes in impairment according to 
the type of theory of mind and the task used for assessment, the 
influence of cognitive impairment and relationship to illness vari-
ables, and the prominent suggestion of a relationship to history 
of psychotic symptoms. Then in part two, the prominent themes 
included a smaller theory of mind impairment in patients with 
bipolar disorder vs. schizophrenia, the relationship to differences 
in symptoms and cognitive impairments between the disorders, 
and the likely consequences of the differences in theory of mind 
impairment for the clinical management of patients with bipolar 
disorders vs. schizophrenia.
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Due to many of the complexities discussed during this theo-
retical review, our understanding of theory of mind impairment 
in bipolar disorder is not yet complete or consolidated, and 
further research will be required before our knowledge reaches 
the advanced state of the literature relating to schizophrenia. 
However, currently available data suggest the following trends. 
First, although consistent differences in impairment between the 
mood states remain elusive, there is convincing evidence that 
theory of mind is impaired in some way across the mood states, 
and into the supposedly asymptomatic state of euthymia. It may, 
therefore, be considered a trait rather than state impairment, i.e., 
one that is an enduring correlate of bipolar disorder. Given that 
the structural neuroanatomical abnormalities associated with 
bipolar disorder include regions crucial for the mediation of 
theory of mind, e.g., medial prefrontal cortex (128), this is perhaps 
not surprising. Genome-wide association studies have similarly 
identified an enduring genetic association between the ZNF804A 
risk-variant known to increase susceptibility for bipolar disorder 
and the phentotype for (ab)normal functional connectivity dur-
ing theory of mind (129). As to methodological generalization, 
given that the processing of emotion cues and some of the com-
mon neurocognitive sub-processes, e.g., “representing mental 
states with propositional content” needed for any form of meta-
representation (130), are compromised in patients with bipolar 
disorder (38, 131–133), it is likely that further research with sensi-
tive methodology will likely demonstrate impairment across both 
cognitive and affective theory of mind. We further predict that the 
possible inter-dependence of impairments in executive functions 
and theory of mind will eventually prove fruitful given the strong 
evidence elsewhere for a deterministic relationship between the 
two processes throughout normal development (134, 135).
Although this review was wide-ranging, it has highlighted a 
number of pertinent gaps in the field, and has identified a number 
of possible future directions. A more comprehensive understand-
ing of theory of mind impairments in bipolar disorder will be of 
great clinical utility in devising improved psychological or cogni-
tive therapies that assist patients with everyday life skills. While 
early studies of bipolar disorder have not yet established a clear 
relationship between these impairments and functional outcome, 
it is known from other patient populations that impaired theory 
of mind is a crucial factor underlying poor life skills, poor social 
cognition, and some aspects of psychosis. Based on this wider evi-
dence set, a phenomenon with this potential impact is deserved of 
further study. Ultimately, if a lack of relationship between theory 
of mind impairment and functional outcome was perpetuated by 
increasingly sophisticated methods, the question of interest then 
becomes what other factor is protecting patients with bipolar 
disorder against the potential for theory of mind impairment to 
compromise functional outcome. As to the question of what should 
be done about theory of mind impairments in bipolar disorder, 
by understanding the cognitive mechanisms that underlie theory 
of mind impairment, reformulations as to how to remediate these 
skills are facilitated. There is certainly optimism about possible 
remediation in the literature on theory of mind in bipolar disorder 
(23, 35), just as there has been for the improvement of theory of 
mind in schizophrenia. Here, close examination of developments 
in the literature on social cognition remediation in schizophrenia 
will likely be of great inspiration. Indeed, there has already been 
one successful report of the benefits of a remediation program 
originally developed for use with patients with schizophrenia 
being transferable to patients with a diagnosis of bipolar disorder 
(127). If the neurodevelopmental nature of schizophrenia and its 
timing mitigate against acquisition of theory of mind to some 
degree (5), the less pronounced neurodevelopmental processes 
behind adult forms of bipolar disorder could be taken to indicate 
an even greater potential for therapeutic success in attempts to 
remediate theory of mind impairment in bipolar disorder. Given 
our increased understanding of the neurobiological networks 
involved in theory of mind, neuroimaging research will help 
elucidate the dysfunctional underlying brain mechanisms across 
the psychoses, and thereby further contribute to new advances in 
the treatment of bipolar disorder.
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